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RESPONSE TO CITY'S STATEMENT OF FACTS

When this Court granted certiorari, it limited the scope of the appeal to the issue of

the applicable statute of limitations. It did not open the appeal to the other issues addressed
b\ the Court of Appeals, such as the retained control doctrine. In light of that limitation.

main- of the City's staled facts have little or no applicability to this appeal. In addition, the
Citv's Fact No. 6. which suggests that Wheeler participated in the decision to place 4X4
timbers on the roof as additional support for the mufflers, has no evidentiary basis in the

Record. Eor its sole support, the City cites to its own Memorandum at the trial level, which

in turn cites to a portion of the Robert Spears deposition (Record at 327-328). where the 4X4
timbers are not even discussed.

Wheeler also notes the City's admission by the City found in paragraph 19 of its
Statement of Facts that "one of the generators overheated and caused [the] fire . . . ." To

support this fact the City cites to a paragraph in its own Amended Complaint, which Wheeler
essentialb denied in its answer. Moreover, this fact appears to be at odds with the City's

contention elsewhere in its Brief that the components of the generator system were delect

free. An overheating generator is not defect free. The City does not even allege that
defective installation work caused the generator to overheat.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Ihe statute of limitations issue was a central part of the trial court's decision granting

Wheeler summary judgment and thus has been properly preserved for appeal. In fact, that
issue is the onlv subject for which certiorari was granted. Wheeler entered into a single

arrangement with the City, which was to deliver a working generator system. There was not
a separate contract or arrangement for the installation (^"components ofthe system. 1Jnder
anv theory, the sale ofthe generator system was not completed until the system was fully

operational and turned over to the City as a usable system. The usability and/or essence of
the transaction tests suggested by Wheeler are supported in the case law and are appropriate
tests for the Court to use. I Jnder any analysis, the City's claims should be dismissed because

thev are beyond the two year statute of limitations for product liability cases.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ISSUE WAS PRESERVED FOR APPEAL

The City takes the unusual position that Wheeler cannot address its statute of
limitations argument, for which issue certiorari was specifically granted, because Wheeler
did not file a cross appeal ofthe denial of its motion to dismiss. This claim is made although

Wheeler prevailed at the trial level on its motion for summary judgment, which ruling
necessarily superceded the earlier denial of Wheeler's motion to dismiss. Moreover, the City
raised the same argument to the Court of Appeals (see the City's Reply Brief of Appellant

in Appellate No. 2()05()557at p. 4), yet the Court of Appeals made the statute of limitations
argument a focal point of its decision.

In addition, the City's parsing ofthe trial court's summary judgment ruling strains the

language bevond its meaning. The trial court identified a number of alternatives for granting

'In Wheeler's Initial Brief, reference was made on page 4. footnote 3 to an Exhibit A.

Although in the Record, the diagrams to he attached as Exhibit A were inadvertently not attached
in the initial Brief but are now attached hereto as Exhibit A.

summary judgment, one of which was that the City's claims were barred by the product
iiabilitv statute of limitations. The trial court clearly staled that, to the extent the City's
claims fall under the Product Liability Act. they are time barred. (R. at 481 r). Such a ruling

direetlv addressed the statute of limitations argument and was favorable to Wheeler. As
noted, it also supplanted the district court's earlier ruling on Wheeler's motion to dismiss,
which was argued at a point in the case where no evidence had yet been presented. Rather,

at that point the trial court had to rule solely on the pleadings. On the other hand, in ruling
on Wheeler's motion for summary judgment, the district court had a rather substantial record
in front of it. For these reasons. Wheeler properly preserved its right to argue that the City's
claims are barred by the product liability statute of limitations.
II.

THE PARTIES DID NOT ENTER INTO TWO SEPARATE CONTRACTS

The City admits that "the components for the generator system constituted a 'single
sale" or a 'single product.'" City's Brief, at 17. It also admits that all such components were

"part ofthe generator sets accepted by the City and paid for by the City as a single item." Id.
at fact No. 10. The City then argues, for the first time, that Wheeler filled two separate and
distinct roles - that of product seller on the one hand, and that of product installer on the
other . Such a claim is neither supported by the record nor by case law. If onh' one product

:After page 483 ofthe Record, it is renumbered starting with page 480. '1 his reference is to
the ilrst page 48 i.

-'Even though the City refers to installation work, the City's Brief makes clear several
times that the claimed defective work was a "modification" ofthe rain caps. City's Brief at
pp.9. 14.

was sold, then only one transaction was completed, and the installation ofthat product cannot
be viewed separately from its purchase.
The City argues that Wheeler's sale of the components was separate from its
installation of those components because that installation occurred after the sale, and thus the

City could have hired any "qualified person" to perform the installation. Of course, the City
would have had to contract and pay for that qualified person's services. Thus, the only way
the City's argument could work is if there were evidence that Wheeler was paid separately
for its installation work. 1lowever, there is no evidence of such an agreement. Wheeler's

initial bid included all the equipment and the totality iW its installation. When the City
modified (he project plans, the City's agreement with Wheeler also changed. Specifically,
the City agreed to install some ofthe components, such as the exhaust pipe and mufflers,
while Wheeler would install other components, such as the generators. There is no evidence,

however, that the City ever agreed to pay Wheeler additional consideration for whatever
installation work Wheeler was to perform.

Richard Carlson's testimony further supports the fact that the City did not pay
additional consideration for the installation work. After describing how he provided the pipe
for the exhaust system, Mr. Carlson was asked about the charges for his work in welding the

rain caps to the pipe as follows:

Q.

Is there any of these invoices that reflects your work on the cap-on the rain
cap?

A.

Well, I didn't call it out separately.

R. at 382. In other words. Carlson onh billed Wheeler for supplying exhaust pipe. Whatever
work he did in installing the rain caps was either not billed or was included in the billing for
the material supplied.
III.

THE TERM "SALE" IS NOT DEFINED IN THE LAW

in its initial Brief, Wheeler pointed out that the Product Liability Act does not define

the term "sale" or otherwise describe when a sale occurs. In response, the City has simply

repeated some ofthe same language used by the Court of Appeals. However, because the

generator svstem was not accepted by the City until it was fully functional and had been
tested bv Wheeler several months after the rain caps had been modified (R. at 321-322), it

cannot be said that a sale took place prior to that time under any acceptable definition. The
deliverv of some components to the Cit> 's property prior to the start-up ofthe system does

not constitute a completed sale. As a further example, assuming the City expected a warranty
on the svstem. it would not reasonably expect that such a period would start when a few

pieces of equipment had been delivered on site. Rather, it would consider the warranty

period to have started only after all the equipment was fully operational.

I*

IV.

THE CITED CASES SUPPORT WHEELER'S POSITION

With one exception, all ofthe cases cited by the City in its Brief are eases cited in
Wheeler's initial Brief. There is thus no point in rehashing Wheeler's analyses ofthe cases

except to note that they speak in Wheeler's favor, as discussed in Wheeler's initial Brief.
The onh' new citation by the City is to American Jurisprudence and a therein cited Texas

Court of Appeals case which purports to define the term "sale." Aside from the question of
its precedential value, the Texas case is also inapposite, holding that a lessor or bailor of a
defective product may be liable, even though not technically a seller, under the theory that
it introduced the product into the stream of commerce. At a minimum, neither AmJur nor
the Texas ease contradicts Wheeler's position that the sale in the instant case was only

complete after the generator system had been fully installed and tested and had been turned
over to the City as an operating system.
V.

THE

USABILITY

AND

ESSENCE

OF

THE

TRANSACTION

TESTS

PROPOSED BY WHEELER MACHINERY ARE APPROPRIATE

The City dismisses both ofthe tests proposed by Wheeler without citation to authority
and without any real analysis. Nowhere does the City point to any eases which disapprove
of either the usability or the essence ofthe transaction tests. Nor does the City address any

ofthe cases cited by Wheeler in support of such tests. Ironically, under the City's recently
advanced two contract theory, it would be to the City's advantage to utilize the essence of

the transaction test. It could then argue that the essence ofthe first transaction was to simply

sell equipment., and the essence ofthe second was to install it. But, as noted repeatedly, the
true essence ofthe transaction at isstie, as admitted by the City itself, was for Wheeler to
deliver a fully functioning generator system.
VI.

WHEELER HAS BEEN CONSISTENT IN ITS POSITION

On pages 16 and 17 of its Brief, the City is quite accusatory of Wheeler relative to
Wheeler's explanation of who controlled the installation and modification work. The City

•I

•.

uses language such as "Wheeler falsely asserts." "argues unabashedly." and "misguided
attempt." Id. Contrary to the City's assertions. Wheeler has been clear and forthright in
explaining its position. However, in light ofthe City's attack, Wheeler reiterates that it lias
always claimed that the modification work, which the City says caused the fire, was
performed by Richard Carlson under the direct supervision and at the direction ofthe Citv.
This was the basis for the trial court finding the City responsible for all such work under the
retained control doctrine. I lowever. for purposes ofthe stattitc of limitations argument, to
the extent Wheeler is held responsible for the modification work of Carlson, that work was

part and parcel ofthe sale ofthe entire system.
In other words, the City has strongly contended that Wheeler, not the City, is
responsible for the actions of Richard Carlson. The Court of Appeals determined that there
was at least enough of an issue oi' fact on that point to preclude summary judgment.
However, this Court limited its grant of certiorari to the statute of limitations issue.

Wheeler's position that, to the extent Wheeler is responsible for the conduct of Mr. Carlson,
the product liability statute of limitations applies, is not an inconsistent position. Rather, that
is a well-recognized way of pleading in the alternative. The trial court took much the same

position in also ruling in the alternalhe. (R. at 481.) 'fhere is thus nothing deceitful or
dishonest either on the part of Wheeler or the trial court in taking such an approach.

CONCLUSION

The modification work which is at issue was part and parcel ofthe sale of a generator

svstem and did not constitute after sale work. Under any ofthe eases cited by the Court of

Appeals, cases cited in the briefs, or tinderthe specific language ofthe IJtah Product I.lability
Act, the Citv's claim sounds in products liability and is barred by the two year statute oi'

limitations. As part of ruling in favor of Wheeler, this Court should consider establishing a
clear test to cover such matters. Wheeler recommends the usability or the essence ofthe
transaction tests, or both of them.

DATED this )0_ day of August, 2007.

KESEER& RUST

Josepn C. Rust
Attorneys for Petitioner Wheeler Machinery
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